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properties of real infants. Yet in Mann’s all too plausible opinion, Tolstoy was
all too capable of sharing them.
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In their introduction to this collection of essays on Stanley Cavell—some new,
some previously published—the editors announce two main aims: “to discuss
a wide and representative range of the topics explored in Cavell’s writings
and . . . to display the internal unity of Cavell’s thought across his treatment
of these topics” (1). The first aim is certainly met. Several major Cavellian
themes are here: there are essays on J. L. Austin and ordinary language, skep-
ticism, the difficulty of philosophy, moral perfectionism, Hollywood “remar-
riage comedies,” and the philosophical significance of the idea of America.
The internal unity mentioned with respect to the second aim is, the editors
suggest, Cavell’s Wittgenstein-influenced “vision” of language, which they gloss
as follows: “the language and concepts we use are invariably ‘ours’ in the
sense that they reflect human interests and, further, that this fact about them
doesn’t undermine their rational authority” (1). Each contribution, they add,
“at least tacitly presupposes” (2) this view of language. Appropriately, there-
fore, the introduction is followed by “The Wittgensteinian Event,” an adapted
excerpt from Cavell’s Philosophy the Day after Tomorrow (2005), in which he
reflects on his debt to Wittgenstein’s later work. This is important: since the
collection expresses its hope to address relatively new, as well as experienced,
readers of Cavell, it seems important to include some direct encounter with
Cavell’s very distinctive voice and a significant theme of his writing, namely,
the complex interrelationship of the “philosophical” and the “literary.” Given
that Cavell stands in many ways outside the philosophical mainstream (to the
latter’s loss), the new reader may be interested to connect this to what Cavell
says of his encounter with the Investigations:
Its changed expectations of philosophy liberated me to think philo-
sophically (according to my lights) about anything, in any medium,
in which I found an interest. . . . In freeing me to explore whatever
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experiences or texts (in whatever medium) genuinely interested me,
seemed to call for my attention, it prompted me into regions that my
participation in the English-speaking institutionalisation of philosophy
over the past half-century has seemed sometimes . . . to wish precisely to
forbid me. (10, 24–25)
There is indeed something liberating about discovering that one’s inter-
ests in literature, film, psychoanalysis, and figures such as Emerson and
Thoreau, often dismissed as not being “proper philosophers,” have philosoph-
ical import in ways one may not have realized, so there are those who in this
sense owe to Cavell what he owes to Wittgenstein.
The scene thus set, the next three essays draw, in very different ways,
on Cavell’s long-standing engagement with J. L. Austin and “ordinary lan-
guage” philosophy. Both Stephen Mulhall and Alice Crary draw our attention
to Cavell’s recent (2005) criticism of Austin’s account of “perlocutionary utter-
ances” such as persuading, convincing, or impressing, and his introduction of
a new class which Cavell calls “passionate utterances.” A major part of the
significance of this, for Mulhall, is that it underlines a rejection of Austin’s
assumption that it is possible to grasp the meaning of an utterance without
any necessary reference to its effects. Whereas for Cavell, Mulhall argues, “the
path of passion” opens up from “each and every utterance” (31); perlocu-
tion is “as internal to any genuine speech-act as are its locutionary and illocu-
tionary dimensions” (31). Crary explores this theme too, though she rereads
Austin in such a way as to argue for a greater compatibility between Austin
and Cavell. Her main purpose is to explore Cavell’s claim that Austin pro-
vides support for the kind of moral perfectionism that the former sees in
Emerson and Thoreau. Focusing on Cavell’s discussion (in Conditions Hand-
some and Unhandsome [1990]) of Nora in Ibsen’s A Doll’s House, Crary argues
that “Cavell hears Nora’s demand for an education as a demand for a kind of
self-cultivation that is simultaneously emotional and cognitive” (59). This illus-
trates a central aspect of moral perfectionism: “the idea that particular modes
of affective response are necessary for moral understanding and . . . [that pos-
sibly] new modes of response will bring fresh moral insights within reach” (3).
In other words, the perfectionist acknowledges his or her emotional contacts
as “capable of making a direct contribution to moral understanding” (58).
One potentially interesting parallel this suggests—though it is not one Crary
mentions or explores—is between this aspect of Cavell’s thought and similar
claims made in the work of Martha Nussbaum, for example, in her treatment
of the moral development of Maggie Verver in Henry James’s The Golden Bowl
(Nussbaum 1990).
The third Austin-related essay is one of the most interesting in
the whole book: Nancy Bauer’s “How to Do Things with Pornography.”
Bauer is concerned with the strategy of some contemporary feminist
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philosophers—her chief examples are Rae Langton and Jennifer Hornsby—
who want to appropriate Austin in the service of an argument that pornog-
raphy violates women’s civil rights. Their method, she claims, is both “a very
bad way to do feminist philosophy” (70) and a misreading of Austin. The kind
of argument to which Bauer objects proceeds roughly as follows. Against the
liberal defense that curtailing the sale of pornography would amount to violat-
ing the right to freedom of speech, it is argued—enter Austin, stage left—that
pornography is a speech act, and thus not only expresses but acts. It acts “both
to subordinate women and to silence them,” and because it thus “inherently and
differentially harms women” (74), it should be actionable under sex discrimi-
nation legislation.
Against the fact that the evidence for pornography’s causing direct
harms such as increased incidences of rape and sexual assault is notoriously
inconclusive, it is sometimes retorted that the issue is not whether pornog-
raphy causes such harms against women, but the fact that it is harm against
women. What is interesting about Langton and Hornsby in this context is that
they are offering an argument for a view that is often expressed as a mere
slogan. But I found Bauer’s counterargument compelling. First, she chal-
lenges their claim that pornography has the authority necessary to subordinate
women, on the grounds that for their argument to succeed, “authority” must
mean far more than just “very strong, even exclusive power to shape certain
of people’s beliefs and attitudes about the world and particularly about how
we should construe sex difference” (87). She argues that it is implausible to
suppose that pornography possesses this stronger sense of authority, in which
“pornographers can be seen to enjoy exclusive power to fix the conventional
signification of pornographic images and words” (88). Secondly, Bauer chal-
lenges the widespread assumption—typically held by both sides of the pornog-
raphy debate—that pornography is a kind of speech (75). And this is where
Cavell enters the picture. In light of the obvious fact that “much pornography
consists in photographs, still or pixelated, of actual human beings on display
before a camera” (75), talking about “the performative effects of pornogra-
phy” requires paying attention to what Cavell calls “the ontology of photog-
raphy and film” (75). In a brief exploration of the erotic power of photogra-
phy and film, Bauer notes Cavell’s claim in The World Viewed that because film
presents us with the human body as something that is “dressed . . .hence poten-
tially undressed” (Cavell 1979, 44), film is “inherently pornographic (though
not inveterately so)” (89; quoting ibid., 45). But this section is disappointingly
brief: one wants to see these rather startling claims explored in more detail,
so it is frustrating to get just a promissory note claiming that matters would be
made clearer by a comparison between Cavell’s work on photography and that
of the film critic Linda Williams on pornographic film. (Insofar as this essay
both grabbed my attention but left me wanting more than it provides, per-
haps it has learned something from the genre that is its focus.) Nevertheless,
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Bauer’s thought-provoking essay certainly succeeds in showing something of
the problems inherent in discussing pornography exclusively under the head-
ing of a kind of speech.
In “The Difficulty of Reality and the Difficulty of Philosophy,” Cora
Diamond discusses a number of diverse examples, the most extended of which
is J. M. Coetzee’s Tanner Lectures The Lives of Animals. Coetzee’s lectures take
the form of a story, in which the fictional philosopher Elizabeth Costello gives
an endowed lecture at a U.S. college which shows how she is “haunted by the
horror of what we do to animals” (99), a lecture discussed with Costello by
various members of the audience at a dinner afterward. In the published ver-
sion of Coetzee’s lectures, there is an introduction by the political philosopher
Amy Gutmann and reflections from various other contributors (such as Peter
Singer). Diamond objects to the way in which the various contributors to this
debate—in supposing Costello to be presenting a position on “animal rights”
or some such, and engaging with her putative arguments—fail to engage with
the way in which Costello is herself presented as a “wounded animal.” The
character should not be treated, Diamond argues, as simply “a device for
putting forward . . . ideas about the resolution of a range of ethical issues, ideas
that can then be abstracted and examined” (100). Such an approach involves
being “deflected”—as Cavell puts it in “Knowing and Acknowledging”—from
a “difficulty of reality to a philosophical or moral problem apparently in the
vicinity” (104). But Diamond’s answer to the question of whether there can be
a form of philosophy that is not so deflected remains somewhat slippery, in
part because the question of what constitutes “philosophy” here is left largely
unanswered.
Diamond mentions Cavell on skepticism, and Cavell’s long-term Har-
vard colleague Hilary Putnam contributes the first of two pieces more explic-
itly on that topic. In a short essay highly appreciative of his colleague, Putnam,
in a way that follows on from Diamond’s central concern, notes that reading
Cavell involves “enter[ing] into a conversation with him, one in which your
entire sensibility and his are involved, and not only your mind and his mind”
(119). Putnam’s essay is quite personal, as he reflects critically on some earlier
remarks of his own on skepticism in order to bring out how Cavell helped him
to see the sense in which skepticism is a “deep issue” (125). Skepticism about
other minds, at least in certain contexts (“Do I really know that Bob here is in
excruciating agony?”), would involve refusing to acknowledge the other as a
human being and “manifest a failure of humanity” (126). Putnam shows his
appreciation for Cavell’s message that our fundamental relation to the world
is “acknowledgment” rather than knowledge (127). Relatedly, in the second
essay on skepticism, coeditor Sanford Shieh asks what Cavell’s response to
skepticism is if it is not an attempted refutation and what exactly the “truth
of skepticism” that Cavell hints at amounts to. Shieh takes issue with other
interpreters of Cavell and focuses on the significance for skepticism of Cavell’s
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account of how ordinary language philosophy seeks to produce the “attune-
ment” on which a linguistic community is founded.
Two further essays focus on Cavell’s relation to Kant and his legacy.
The first of these continues with the theme of skepticism about other minds.
Paul Franks presents Cavell as a post-Kantian: Kantian in the sense that he
recognizes the importance in the history of philosophy of Kant’s account of
human finitude; post-Kantian in the sense that he sees Kant’s own response
to this as inadequate. Through his account of the Ding an sich, Kant presents
human finitude as “an insurmountable failure of the human,” whereas Cavell
seeks “a positive conception of human finitude that does not understand the
human as a privation but rather accepts or acknowledges our finitude” (167).
Franks then considers one of Kant’s critics, Fichte, with whom he finds some
surprising parallels with Cavell. The Kantian theme continues with Eli Fried-
lander, who draws on the Critique of Judgment to trace Kant’s notion of exem-
plification, a key theme in Cavellian moral perfectionism. This is interesting,
but one wonders whether Friedlander’s essay doesn’t underplay the difference
between an example, in the sense of a mere specimen, and an exemplar in the
Cavellian moral perfectionist sense: someone who discloses, and inspires one
to strive for, one’s “higher self.”
Given Cavell’s singular contribution to the field of film and philoso-
phy, the inclusion of a piece from Stuart Klawans, film critic of The Nation,
is an inspired choice. In an interesting, witty, and energetic essay, Klawans
puzzles over why Cavell doesn’t discuss Preston Sturges’s 1942 movie The Palm
Beach Story in Pursuits of Happiness (1981b), his book on what he terms the
“Hollywood comedy of remarriage.” Klawans’s reading of the film focuses on
its female lead, Claudette Colbert, and compares this later movie to an earlier
Colbert film, It Happened One Night (1934), which Cavell does discuss in detail.
Klawans eventually reaches the conclusion that despite the prima facie case for
including The Palm Beach Story in the genre, Cavell was right to exclude it: it
is a “comedy of disillusionment” (229) rather than a comedy of remarriage.
In his discussion, part of which is something of a eulogy to Colbert, Klawans
makes the interesting observation that despite his insistence upon the impor-
tance of the particular star of these movies, Cavell does not “inquire into an
actor’s performance or looks” (220). (What impact does the latter have, one
might wonder, on Bauer’s observations about the relevance of Cavell’s work
on film to pornography?)
The final essay of the volume is also one of the most interesting.
In “The Recovery of Greece and the Discovery of America,” James Conant
compares some remarks of the Greek poet George Sefaris to the effect that
“‘Greek Hellenism’ . . .has not yet been created” with Cavell’s gnomic remark
in The Senses of Walden (1981a) that “America exists only in its discovery”
(230). I shall focus on the latter. In unpacking the wider context of Cavell’s
remark, Conant argues that “Cavell takes Thoreau to take ‘America’ to name
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something that those who wish to think of themselves as American must work
to make happen” (235). He compares “America” as an ideal to Kierkegaard’s
remarks about the “monstrous illusion” of Christendom, in which people
think of themselves as Christian simply in virtue of living in a “Christian
country,” regardless of any inner relation to the claims Christianity, properly
understood, makes on the individual. Similarly one is not American, in the
Thoreauian-Cavellian sense, simply in virtue of living on a particular land mass
or being entitled to possess a particular kind of passport. So what is America
as a philosophical ideal? Conant explains:
It is constitutive of America as originally conceived that it be open
to everyone and that it can claim to exist only to the extent that a
nation exists in which each American’s claim to be an American does
not depend upon his or her rootedness in the particularities that con-
stitute most other national communities—particularities of language, or
creed, or race, or place of birth or ethnic heritage. ‘America’ there-
fore is both the name of a very particular people with a very particular
history and the name of a certain ideal of national community—one
that is to be an example to the rest of the world—that not only is able
to transcend the parochial ties that previously bound together other
peoples, but that . . . is able to transform the world’s understanding of
what a nation should be. (240; my emphasis)
But for all the differences in our nations’ histories and origins, this
British reader could not help but wonder how different this ideal of nation-
hood is from that of any modern democracy in western Europe, for instance.
(Conant raises, but leaves unanswered, related questions at the very end of his
essay.) There is a debate in the United Kingdom at present about the nature of
“Britishness,” given the contributions made in Britain, like the United States,
by sizable ethnic minority communities, most of whom report thinking of
themselves as British as well as Asian (for example). Is it being claimed that
to be British in this sense one needs to be American in Cavell’s sense? That
would be a peculiar form of cultural imperialism indeed.
Conant discusses the complex relation between “America” and
“Europe” in Cavell’s thought, but perhaps the most interesting question is the
one which Cavell says predated his obsession with Walden—“Why has Amer-
ica never expressed itself philosophically?”—or rather, its refinement into the
question of why, each time a “distinctly American cultural voice emerges,
America fails to acknowledge it as such” (243). This explains, for instance,
Cavell’s interest in remarriage comedies, which he views as some of the great-
est achievements of Hollywood, yet which he also considers typically to be
devalued by “American intellectuals” as something of less than permanent
value (250).
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In short, this is a very valuable collection of essays that certainly illus-
trates the wide-ranging nature of Cavell’s interests and something of the quirk-
iness that makes him one of the most fascinating contemporary philosophical
voices—on any continent.
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